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Abstract 
Lucio Baccaro and Jonas Pontusson make a significant contribution to comparative 
political economy with their approach to analyzing growth in advanced economies 
that focuses on the demand side of the economy and distributive conflict. In contrast 
to Baccaro and Pontusson, however, we view their approach as reinforcing recent 
developments in varieties of capitalism rather than undermining them. We also 
believe that the type of modern macroeconomics used by (for instance) Carlin and 
Soskice is better placed than their Post-Keynesian framework to analyze growth 
models; and that their approach is not inconsistent with it. Modern macroeconomic 
models incorporate a role for the state, as they do not, —including monetary and 
fiscal policy—and provide a coherent framework within which to analyze both the 
supply and demand sides of the economy; they also enable us to understand the 
interactions between economies and hence the role of growth models in global 
imbalances. 
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Baccaro and Pontusson’s ambitious and important article sets out their new analytical 
approach to comparative political economy (CPE). The article seeks to explain the 
commonalities and divergences in the trajectories of advanced economies since the 
collapse of the Fordism in the 1970s by identifying national growth models. Growth 
models are pinned down by the relative contribution of the different components of 
aggregate demand — consumption, investment, government spending and net exports 
— to overall economic growth. 
The key theoretical innovation of the article is to use a Post-Keynesian 
macroeconomic framework in which output is determined by effective demand rather 
than the supply side. In the tradition of Polish economist Michał Kalecki, Baccaro and 
Pontusson (hereby referred to as B&P) also put the distribution of income, both 
between labour and capital and among wage earners, at the centre of their analysis. 
They see growth models as being closely associated, as both cause and effect, with 
distributive conflict. 
As B&P note, there is considerable agreement that advanced capitalist economies 
collectively pursued a wage-led growth model during the Fordist era that ran from the 
end of WWII through to the mid-1970s. In that period, rising real wages and strong 
productivity gains jointly fed the expansion of household consumption and 
investment. 1  The wage-led growth model was underpinned by unemployment 
insurance and collective bargaining based on strong unions, but faltered from the 
1970s onwards as a result of both short-term factors (e.g. industrial strife and 
stagflation) and longer-term structural trends (e.g. deindustrialization, financialization 
and union decline). The end of Fordism was associated with a decline in the share of 
gross domestic product (GDP) going to labour and rising inequality among 
households. 
The growth models that replaced wage-led (or productivity-led) growth differed 
markedly across advanced economies. B&P’s analysis concentrates on the two post-
Fordist growth models most commonly analyzed in the recent CPE literature: 
consumption-led and export-led.2  The empirical analysis in the article focuses on 
Germany, Italy, Sweden and the UK. B&P present persuasive evidence that economic 
growth during the 1994-2007 sample period was consumption-led in the UK, export-
led in Germany, balanced in Sweden, and largely absent in Italy. 
B&P’s analysis finds that household consumption can be financed by either wages or 
credit, and that these forms of financing are often complementary supports of the 
consumption-led growth model. The analysis also finds that the ability of economies 
to combine household consumption growth with export success depends crucially on 
the price sensitivity of their exports. In countries where export volumes are sensitive 
to changes in prices (or real exchange rates) an export-led growth model is likely to 
require the repression of wages and household consumption, which has knock-on 
effects for inequality, particularly at the low-end of the income distribution. 
The article makes several important contributions to the CPE literature. First, it 
focuses on the demand side, which has been underexplored in the existing CPE 
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literature on advanced post-industrial economies. Second, it attempts to bring the 
valuable economic ideas of Kalecki into the CPE debate. An important Kaleckian 
insight that underpins B&P’s analysis is that redistribution of income from rich to 
poor will boost consumption and aggregate demand because the poor have a higher 
marginal propensity to consume out of current income than the rich. This fits closely 
with the key CPE themes of inequality and redistribution. Lastly, the article seeks to 
explain both cross-country differences and trajectories of change in advanced 
capitalist economies. This stands it apart from the existing CPE literature, which is 
often criticized for not paying enough attention to how economies and institutions 
evolve over time.3 
Our overarching view is that B&P’s article opens up a new and exciting field in CPE 
scholarship—one that we hope to contribute to more fully in the future. However, in 
contrast to B&P, we see the growth models approach as supporting recent 
developments in varieties of capitalism rather than undermining them, as we discuss 
at length in the next section. We also think that modern macroeconomics has a lot to 
offer the study of growth models and that it is not necessarily at odds with the Post-
Keynesian macroeconomics used in the article. In Section 3, we therefore set out a 
simple modern macroeconomic model and discuss why it is so important to 
incorporate a role for the state—including monetary and fiscal policy—into any 
macroeconomic framework hoping to shed light on growth trajectories during the 
post-Fordist period.  
 
Varieties of capitalism and growth models 
B&P show that there was a significant difference in the contribution that consumption 
growth made to economic growth in Sweden and Germany over the sample period 
(1994-2007). While both countries had good export performance, only Sweden was 
able to combine that with robust household consumption growth. As Germany and 
Sweden are both defined as coordinated market economies (CMEs) by the varieties of 
capitalism approach, B&P use the divergence in their growth trajectories to dismiss 
varieties of capitalism as a useful framework for understanding post-industrial growth 
models. 
In contesting this position, we are not arguing that Germany and Sweden are similar 
postindustrial political economies: notably, Germany has developed a dualist labour 
market while Sweden has not. And Sweden has managed in part in consequence to 
limit the increase in the post-tax and transfer Gini, as well as the rise in poverty to a 
noticeably greater extent than has Germany. B&P’s article is of great importance in 
bringing income distribution into our understanding of post-industrial growth — it 
does indeed influence the role of consumption across CMEs. But we will argue that 
B&P’s position is wholly consistent with and ultimately dependent upon varieties of 
capitalism. 
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Consumption- and export-led growth in LMEs and CMEs   
B&P’s empirical results show that net exports were a major driver of GDP growth in 
Germany and Sweden, the two CMEs in the analysis, whereas net exports made a 
negative contribution to growth in the UK, the single liberal market economy (LME) 
in the analysis. Consumption growth in the UK also vastly outpaced that in Germany 
and Sweden. An initial and salient point to make is that this is precisely the analytic 
prediction of the varieties of capitalism approach.4 
Moreover, empirically, when we broaden the B&P analysis to a wider set of advanced 
economies, the difference in the relative importance of export demand drivers and 
consumption demand drivers in LMEs and CMEs over the post-industrial period is 
very clear. Figure 1 plots the average annual contributions of consumption and net 
exports to gross domestic product (GDP) growth over 1994-2007 for a sample of 20 
OECD economies.5 
We can see from the linear trend line in Figure 1 that there was a negative correlation 
between the contributions of consumption and net exports to growth during the 
sample period. The red dotted rectangle in the top-left hand corner of the figure 
contains countries with rapid consumption growth and a negative contribution of net 
exports to growth—consumption-led economies. In contrast, the dotted blue rectangle 
in the bottom right hand corner shows the countries with relatively low consumption 
growth and a positive contribution of net exports to growth—export-led economies. 
The markers in the figure correspond to varieties of capitalism. The dark blue 
diamonds are CMEs and the red points are LMEs. The light blue squares are the 
mixed market economies (MMEs) that sit somewhere in between. Contrary to B&P’s 
argument, what is clear from the figure is the significance of varieties of capitalism 
(or some related classification) for growth models in the post-Fordist era; the export-
led economies are CMEs and the consumption-led economies are LMEs (and MMEs). 
The significance of the distribution of income in explaining the importance of 
consumption to growth (one of B&P’s key points) can be very clearly seen for the 
CME group of economies.  The contribution of household consumption to growth is 
significantly greater in the more egalitarian Nordic countries than in the less 
egalitarian Germany, Japan and Switzerland.  Note, of course, that consumption is 
still much less important in the Nordics than in the LMEs, and its greater importance 
in the LMEs is hardly to be explained by a more egalitarian income distribution! 
Figure 1 provides prima facie evidence countering B&P’s claim that varieties of 
capitalism and growth models are not closely related.  But it shows correlation and 
not causation. What then explains the striking correlation between varieties of 
capitalism and the relative importance of net exports and consumption to growth? 
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Figure 1. The average annual contribution of consumption and net exports to GDP growth 
(1994-2007) 
 
Source: OECD Annual National Accounts; authors’ calculations.   
Note: The black line is a simple linear trend line. The markers correspond to varieties of capitalism. 
The dark blue diamonds are CMEs and the red points are LMEs. (The light blue squares are MMEs.) 
 
It is certainly true that the institutions underpinning CMEs and LMEs, as well as the 
organization of companies and career structures, have changed very substantially in 
the last quarter century. The radical technologies of the 1980s and early 1990s6 have 
now become widely diffused as incremental innovations through the advanced sectors 
of CMEs, so that the technological landscape looks quite different today. While 
manufacturing still plays a more important role in CMEs than in LMEs, the share of 
manufacturing has fallen significantly everywhere; and manufacturing activity still 
located in CMEs involves little ‘traditional’ physical activity. While collective 
agreements still cover a large percentage of regular employees in most CMEs, 
unionization rates have generally fallen. In addition, employment protection for 
temporary workers has fallen sharply in all CMEs.7 
Moreover, just as there are significant differences between the LMEs as there always 
have been, the CMEs also operate very differently from one another. And to reiterate 
a political point that Pontusson has made powerfully in the past, the Nordic 
economies are different to the continental CMEs; shown recently at length by Iversen 
and Soskice.8  While all CMEs still operate strong ‘insurance’ systems for regular 
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employees, the Nordics are more redistributive and the northern European continental 
CMEs are more purely insurance based. In addition, as Thelen clearly documents, 
strong labour unions are not confined to the core manufacturing sectors in the Nordic 
countries, which helps to protect the wages of low-skilled services sector workers.9 
These are indeed the Kaleckian reasons for the Nordics having a generally higher 
contribution of consumption to growth—that B&P identify in Sweden and that Figure 
1 shows applies more broadly across the Nordic countries. 
So why should CMEs, despite the differences between them and large changes over 
time, have adopted export-led growth models? Independently of monetary policy and 
exchange-rate systems, these economies are driven strategically by export orientation: 
a large proportion of high value-added employment comes directly and indirectly 
from the export sector. The success of the export and related high value-added sectors 
depends on research and development in knowledge-based companies, on close two-
way links with the technical university and research systems, and on the system of 
vocational training at all levels, including increasingly the tertiary. Equally, the 
success of these systems depends on the capacity of the export sector to meet long-
term profitability goals, especially as the cost of product and process innovation 
increases. This is a powerful and central positive feedback system in which the 
successful and growing knowledge base and accumulated skill formation are core 
drivers of exports, and where success in export growth is critical—via the resources it 
provides for advanced companies to make the necessary investments in the relevant 
systems—for high levels of research and skill formation.10 
 
Germany and Sweden and relative export-price sensitivity 
B&P suggest that the price sensitivity of exports must be taken into account in order 
to explain the difference between the German and Swedish growth models. They 
claim that German exports were more price sensitive than Swedish exports over the 
sample period, and that this was driven by the move of Swedish exporters into less 
price-sensitive, “knowledge-intensive, high value-added, goods and services”. Hence, 
German, but not Swedish, export success required the repression of domestic wages 
and consumption. In support of their argument, B&P present a large amount of 
descriptive data and a regression analysis into the relative price sensitivity of exports 
in the two countries. Our view is that B&P’s argument misses several important 
factors that affected the evolution of the German and Swedish economies over the 
sample period, and that the empirical support for their argument is relatively weak. 
More formally, we dispute their export-price sensitivity hypothesis on four counts. 
i) Major structural shocks to the German and Swedish economies in the early 1990s 
The sample period of the empirical analysis in the article is 1994-2007. In order to 
fully explain the evolution of the German and Swedish economies over this period, 
however, we believe it is necessary to go back slightly further. Both Germany and 
Sweden experienced major structural shocks in the first half of the 1990s that strongly 
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influenced their trajectories over the sample period. Germany reunified in 1990 after 
45 years as a divided nation. The Bundesbank responded to the inflationary risks 
posed by reunification by aggressively tightening monetary policy.11 The early 1990s 
also saw the bursting of a financial bubble in Sweden that led to their most severe 
recession since the 1930s; unemployment jumped from under 2% in 1990 to over 
11% in 1993.12 
Figure 2 charts the path of price and cost competitiveness in Germany and Sweden 
between 1991 and 2007. We can see that German competiveness deteriorated 
markedly in the first half of the 1990s due to the burden of reunification and the 
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate that occurred when the Bundesbank raised 
interest rates. In contrast, Sweden’s competitiveness improved by around 20% in the 
same period because of the substantial nominal depreciation that accompanied the 
sharp downturn in the economy. 
 
Figure 2. Price and cost competitiveness in Germany and Sweden (1991-2007) 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No 97, June 2015 
Note: Price competitiveness is based on consumer prices (CPI) and cost competitiveness is based on 
real unit labour costs (relative to a sample of 49 trading countries). An increase in the indices signifies 
an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate and a deterioration of the competitive position. 
B&P present German wage moderation and slow household consumption growth in 
the sample period as evidence supporting their argument that German exports have 
become more reliant on price competition over time. However, the picture is 
incomplete without taking reunification into account. The improvement in price 
competitiveness in Germany during the sample period was required to counteract the 
loss of competitiveness associated with reunification;13 in fact, as Figure 2 shows, the 
German economy was no more price competitive at the end of the sample period than 
it was in 1991. Likewise, the large improvement in competitiveness in Sweden 
directly before the sample period began meant there was much less pressure on 
Swedish firms to hold down wages for competitiveness reasons during the sample 
period.  
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The patterns in wage growth and competitiveness are mirrored in household 
consumption. If the years 1991-1993 are included in the sample period then the 
average annual contribution of consumption to GDP growth is virtually identical in 
Sweden (0.90%) and Germany (0.82%). 14  This is particularly important as the 
difference in the importance of consumption to growth in the two countries in the 
cornerstone of B&P’s dismissal of varieties of capitalism. 
ii) The relative sophistication of German and Swedish manufactured exports 
B&P suggest that one reason for the difference in price sensitivity between German 
and Swedish exports is their relative sophistication. They argue that the German high 
value-added CME model became “exhausted in the course of the 1990s” but that 
Swedish exporters successfully moved into high-tech goods and services. When 
concentrating on manufactured goods, this story holds little water. German 
manufactured exports were some of the most high tech in the world in the latter part 
of the sample period. High-technology manufactures made up 20% of total German 
exports of manufactured goods and primary products from agriculture and mining in 
2005. While the equivalent share for Sweden was slightly higher at 23%, the 
combined share of high-technology and medium-high-technology exports was 
considerably higher in Germany (71%) than in Sweden (60%). In addition, the 
average annual growth rate of high-technology exports in Germany between 1996 and 
2005 was over twice as high as that in Sweden.15 
The evolution of German competitiveness in Figure 2 also provides evidence against 
German exporters moving away from competition based on innovative, high-quality 
products and toward competition based on price. The fact that cost competitiveness 
improved during the 2000s but price competitiveness remained relatively flat suggests 
that German firms used their cost savings during the latter part of the sample period to 
support investment and innovation rather than to cut prices. 16  This shows the 
importance German firms still place on the non-price competitiveness (i.e. quality) of 
their products (in line with a high value-added CME export model). 
iii) Movement of German production facilities to Central and Eastern Europe 
Another important development that helps explain the trajectory of the German 
economy during the sample period is that German companies shifted large parts of the 
production processes to Central and Eastern European countries following the fall of 
the Iron Curtain. Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia are located close 
to Germany and have similar education systems and institutions, but labour costs are 
just a fraction of those in Germany and working regulations are more flexible.17 This 
combination makes these countries particularly attractive for German foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Germany was responsible for 21.5% of all FDI into the eight 
Central and Eastern European economies in the early 2000s compared to just 4.2% for 
Sweden.18 While German domestic investment languished over the sample period, 
German investment in production facilities in Central and Eastern Europe grew 
rapidly, creating approximately 700,000 new jobs in the area.19         
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The outsourcing of the labour-intensive upstream production activities to Central and 
Eastern Europe had dramatic implications for the German labour market. It reduced 
the bargaining power of low-skilled German workers and put downward pressure on 
their wages.20 This is therefore an important missing ingredient in B&P’s analysis, 
which helps to explain developments in German wages and household consumption 
over the sample period, as well as the increase in low-end earnings inequality. 
iv) The empirical evidence on relative export-price sensitivity 
To test their proposition that German exports were more price sensitive that Swedish 
exports during the sample period, B&P carry out an OLS regression for both countries 
(as well as Italy and the UK).  The dependent variable in the analysis is the change in 
exports (at constant prices) and the independent variable is the change in the real 
effective exchange rate (a measure of price competitiveness). Each regression 
contains a constant but no control variables. The results show a negative and 
statistically significant effect (at the 10% level) for Germany and a smaller negative 
and statistically insignificant effect for Sweden. B&P take these results as empirical 
support for their hypothesis. However, Gelman and Stern caution against comparing 
the results of two regressions by looking at the significance levels of the coefficients 
and instead propose focusing on the statistical significance of the difference between 
the coefficients.21  B&P’s results do not pass this test; the difference between the 
German and Swedish coefficients is not even close to statistical significance.22 In 
addition, B&P’s empirical strategy does not deal with potential endogeneity 
problems. Carlin, Glyn and Van Reenen suggest that reverse causality and omitted 
variable bias are likely to undermine the credibility of regression analyses, such as 
B&P’s, that use national level data to look at the relationship between 
contemporaneous changes in export market shares (or volumes) and real unit labour 
costs (or real effective exchange rates).23 
The existing empirical literature also casts serious doubt on B&P’s two central 
propositions: i) that exports became more price sensitive in Germany over the sample 
period; and ii) that Sweden did not suffer this problem because it shifted into 
exporting high-end, knowledge-intensive goods and services. Stahn estimates error 
correction models for German exports and finds that German exports to countries 
both inside and outside the Eurozone have become less price sensitive since the 
1990s.24 Ahmed et al. use a panel framework across 46 countries and find that the 
sensitivity of manufacturing exports to the real exchange rate has fallen over time, 
especially in countries (such as Germany) that have shifted large parts of their value 
chain overseas.25 This is because exchange rate depreciation increases the cost of 
importing intermediate goods as well as improving the competitiveness of final 
exports. Imbs and Méjean compute structural estimates of export elasticities for a 
wide range of countries and commodities in the 1990s and 2000s and estimate that the 
price sensitivity of aggregate exports is slightly higher for Sweden than Germany.26 
Lastly, while we agree with B&P that Sweden had more success in exporting high-
value added services than Germany during the sample period, the empirical evidence 
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does not support their claim that these exports are less price sensitive. In fact, in a 
panel data study across 66 countries, Eichengreen and Gupta find that modern 
services of the type Sweden specializes in, such as information, telecommunications 
and computer services, are more sensitive to changes in the real exchange rate than 
traditional goods and services exports, and that this holds across both advanced and 
developing economies.27 
 
Macroeconomics and growth models 
Let us again say that we are hugely sympathetic to B&P’s article. Their Post-
Keynesian macroeconomic framework focuses on the demand side of the economy, 
which is often overlooked in CPE models. It also puts inequality— correctly—at the 
centre of demand analyses of growth. 
Mainstream modern macroeconomics is a complex and divided field, which can often 
seem impenetrable to those outside the discipline. However, we believe that simple 
macroeconomic models, of the type used (informally) by Blanchard, Krugman, 
Nickell, Stiglitz, Bernanke and many others, have a lot to offer the study of growth 
models.28 This approach to macroeconomics is set out more formally in Carlin and 
Soskice’s Macroeconomics: Institutions, Instability and the Financial System.29 These 
models have two major advantages over the Post-Keynesian model used in the article. 
First, they allow for the study of the supply as well as the demand side of the 
economy within a single coherent framework. We view the interaction of supply and 
demand as crucial to determining growth trajectories. Second, they incorporate, as 
Baccaro and Pontusson do not, the government and macroeconomic demand 
management—including monetary and fiscal policy. We believe that international 
monetary arrangements were particularly important in shaping the macroeconomic 
developments of recent decades, including the analysis of how growth patterns in 
different countries interact to produce global imbalances. 
In the following section, we briefly discuss the evolution of the field and then set out 
a simple mainstream macroeconomic model. We then discuss how the model relates 
to B&P’s model and show how it can be used to analyze growth models and the role 
played by macroeconomic policies. 
Understanding modern macroeconomics 
The demise of traditional Keynesian economics in the 1970s largely reflected its 
absence of a coherent theory of inflation at a time when inflation and unemployment 
combined (stagflation) was seen as the primary problem of economic policy. A period 
of intellectual chaos ensued.  Macroeconomics has developed in different ways in the 
last four or so decades. And it is fair to say that the internal debates within the 
discipline have come to be dominated by two schools in particular, Real Business 
Cycle theory (RBC) and New Keynesian economics. Despite its several associated 
Nobel prize-winners, and the fact that it is still staple teaching in many graduate 
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schools, RBC—with its roots in Chicago and the mid-West—is regarded by many 
macroeconomists (including many of those in universities on the ‘two coasts’ such as 
Harvard, Princeton, MIT, NYU, Berkeley and Stanford) as aesthetically beautiful but 
mad. (It assumes perfect competition in all markets and that markets clear 
continuously; it also assumes perfect foresight based on rational expectations. 
Movements of economic aggregates are generated by random ‘technology’ shocks, 
and persistent movements are generated by the assumption that the shocks are auto-
correlated. We could go on.) 
The alternative New Keynesian approach started from two simple but sensible 
assumptions: that companies everywhere operate under conditions of imperfect 
competition, setting prices and meeting demand; and that prices can only be set at 
discrete intervals of time (e.g. annually) and not continuously.  But the contemporary 
déformation professionelle 30  of economists is to apply forward-looking rational 
expectations under all feasible circumstances. As a consequence markets are assumed 
to clear in improbable ways. The result has increasingly been macro-models of great 
complexity that bear little relation to reality. The dysfunctional driver of evolutionary 
progress in New Keynesian economics has been the internal theoretical standards of 
the academic profession, rather than a concern to understand how the macro-economy 
works. 
We believe Baccaro and Pontusson are perfectly right to be critical of New Keynesian 
models, but not of what might be called realistic modern macroeconomics, which has 
been gradually informally developed by many leading macroeconomists (see endnote 
28), and is in practice used by central bank policymakers and macroeconomic 
forecasters around the world. It combines many of the theoretical advances of New 
Keynesian macroeconomics but steps away from the (unrealistic) assumption that all 
actors are fully forward-looking and rational. It is this realistic and pragmatic 
approach to modern macroeconomics that Carlin and Soskice develop in their 
simplified version of the 3-equation model.31 
We believe the 3-equation model is well-placed to shed light on the growth models of 
advanced economies during the post-Fordist period. The model has three major 
elements: 
(1) Output (including growth) is driven by effective demand in the short run. Effective 
demand is the sum of consumer expenditure, investment, government expenditure and 
net exports. (The equation requires the assumption of some degree of imperfect 
competition: in fact, in the 1930s discussions, Keynes wrongly assumed perfect 
competition unlike both Joan Robinson and Kalecki who understood the need for 
imperfect competition if companies were to respond to increased demand by 
increased output.) This is the basis for focusing on demand drivers in models of 
growth (at least in the short run). 
The first major element of the 3-equation model is perfectly consistent with the 
distribution of income being a determinant of consumer expenditure (as Kalecki and 
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B&P attest), even if most discussion is in terms of the influence of the interest rate on 
household consumption. 
(2) Phillips curve.  Increasing inflation is generated by effective demand pushing 
unemployment below the ‘equilibrium’ unemployment rate consistent with stable 
inflation. Rowthorn originally defined the equilibrium rate in terms of class conflict 
(as Joseph Stiglitz later did) as the unemployment rate which kept the bargaining 
demands of workers for real wages down to the real wages required to generate the 
profitability permitted by markets.32 It is the supply side of the economy that pins 
down the equilibrium levels of output and unemployment in the medium run in the 
model, but the equilibrium can shift in response to changes in the bargaining power of 
labour and the power of business to increase profit markups. Also, as the whole 
theory of wage coordination shows, when increased bargaining power permits wage 
coordination across sectors, the result is likely to be a lower not a higher equilibrium 
unemployment rate. 
(3) Monetary (or interest rate) rule (MR). Central banks use the interest rate to reduce 
or increase effective demand to keep unemployment over time close enough to the 
equilibrium rate to stabilize inflation at its target rate (inflation targeting). If we 
assume the interest rate is above the Zero Lower Bound (where the real interest rate is 
constrained because the nominal interest rate cannot fall below zero), as it is 
throughout the period that B&P are analyzing, this closes the system. 
The first point that we want to emphasize therefore is that there is nothing 
inconsistent between this 3-equation system and B&P’s Post-Keynesian approach to 
macroeconomics. Their macroeconomics is simply the effective demand equation (1) 
with the distribution of income as an important determinant of consumer expenditure.  
As to Kalecki: B&P use Kalecki’s macroeconomics to point to the importance of the 
distribution to effective demand.  But Kalecki was also deeply preoccupied by 
inflation, and had a more acute sense than Keynes of the idea that it represented 
conflict in society—as the title of Rowthorn’s seminal 1977 article, Conflict, Inflation 
and Money, indicates.33 B&P are not interested in inflation and unemployment as 
Kalecki was. Thus in our view their Post-Keynesian affiliation, which seems to hinge 
on Post-Keynesians having adopted Kalecki (many years after his death), is at best 
misleading. 
Unlike B&P’s model, the 3-equation model can be used to analyze the response of the 
economy to demand and supply side shocks. When the economy is hit by a shock, 
such as a change in world demand or a change in labour market regulation, the central 
bank steps in to stabilize the economy and return it to equilibrium output and target 
inflation. It uses the interest rate as its policy lever and must take account of the 
reaction of the foreign exchange market when conducting monetary policy. Interest 
rate rises will reduce interest-sensitive spending but will also increase demand for 
domestic currency and appreciate the real exchange rate, which in turn harms net 
exports (the opposite holds for interest rate cuts). The growth model of an economy is 
determined by the contribution of the different components of aggregate demand to 
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growth. Demand and supply shocks have the power to influence growth models in the 
3-equation model. For example, a positive demand shock, such as a rise in consumer 
confidence, will require the central bank to temporarily raise interest rates. Once back 
at equilibrium output and target inflation, the appreciated exchange rate will have 
dampened down net exports—hence, the economy has become more consumption-
led. 
The role of government and macro demand management 
Another major advantage of the 3-equation model for studying growth models is that 
it mirrors the set of macroeconomic institutions that characterized advanced 
economies during the post-Fordist era. As we have seen the economy is stabilized by 
an inflation-targeting central bank and the government can influence effective 
demand through fiscal policy. For a comparative political economic analysis, B&P’s 
article says little about macroeconomic policy, and monetary and fiscal policies are 
not incorporated into their macroeconomic framework. Monetary, fiscal and other 
government policies played an important role in supporting growth models during the 
sample period. Unlike B&P’s model, the 3-equation model provides a coherent 
framework within which to explore the interaction of macroeconomic policy and 
growth models further. 
Why, for example, were central banks aggressively inflation averse in both Sweden 
and (pre-Eurozone) Germany during the sample period, but not in the UK? In 
countries with a small number of powerful unions, it pays for the central bank to be 
conservative.34 A conservative central bank will respond to any increase in inflation 
above target by aggressively raising interest rates, resulting in an appreciation of the 
exchange rate and worsening export sector competitiveness. Each union is large 
enough to know that a high wage settlement will push up inflation. Hence unions are 
more likely to choose wage moderation when the central bank is conservative, 
because the deterioration in export competitiveness that accompanies the high wage 
route would put at least some core jobs at risk. Conversely, the central bank’s stance 
cannot affect the incentives for wage moderation in countries where wage bargaining 
is decentralized, because each wage setter is too small to factor in the effect of their 
wage settlement on the economy-wide price level. 
The conservativeness of the central bank is reflected in the slope of the monetary rule 
in the 3-equation model. The flatter the monetary rule, the more the central bank 
raises interest rates for any given deviation of inflation from target. A central bank 
with a flat monetary rule is said to be ‘inflation averse’. The conservativeness of the 
central bank is often measured by their independence from government. On this 
metric, the German and Swedish central banks were more conservative than the UK 
central bank during the sample period. The mandates of the Swedish Riksbank and 
the German Bundesbank (and later the European Central Bank) focused solely on 
price stability and the government had no role in setting the inflation target, whereas 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer set the inflation target in the UK and the Bank of 
England had a secondary objective to support the government’s growth and 
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employment policies.35 The more conservative monetary arrangements in Germany 
and Sweden tally with their industrial relations systems, which have a small number 
of powerful unions. Wage setting is much more decentralized in the UK. Monetary 
regimes were therefore closely tied to growth models during the sample period. The 
tight regimes in Germany and Sweden (and other coordinated market economies) 
supported export-led growth by providing the incentives for wage moderation. At the 
opposite end of the scale, the discretionary regime in place in the UK (and other 
liberal market economies) gave more scope for supporting demand and the 
consumption-led growth model. 
German wage restraint in the 2000s is central to B&P’s claim that German exports 
became more price sensitive over the sample period. However, German wage restraint 
cannot be fully understood without considering the change in monetary institutions 
that took place when Germany adopted the euro. Upon joining the Eurozone in 1999, 
the Bundesbank had to relinquish control of monetary policy to the European Central 
Bank (ECB). Contrary to the nationally focused Bundesbank, the ECB mandate was 
to target inflation in the Eurozone as a whole. This meant that if inflation in the other 
member states was above the ECB’s target of 2% then Germany would have to keep 
its inflation below 2% in order to avoid an ECB rate tightening that would harm 
export competitiveness. This is exactly what happened; German inflation was 
persistently below the ECB’s target between 1999 and 2007; average inflation was 
1.6% in Germany, whereas average Eurozone inflation was just above target at 
2.1%. 36  In effect, Germany became the ‘deflator of last resort’ as fast-growing 
economies such as Greece, Ireland and Spain struggled to contain inflation. The 
introduction of the euro therefore put German exporters under additional pressure to 
constrain wage growth.  
Fiscal policy also influences growth models. A permanent change in government 
spending in the 3-equation model alters the composition of aggregate demand in the 
medium run. We can use the model to trace the effect of a lasting reduction in 
government spending through the economy. A fall in government spending reduces 
aggregate demand. The central bank responds to the fall in output and inflation by 
lowering the real interest rate, which in turn triggers the real exchange rate to 
depreciate. Export competitiveness improves and net exports expand. Once back at 
medium-run equilibrium, the aggregate demand lost through lower government 
spending has been replaced by net exports—the economy has become more export-
led. A conservative fiscal policy regime also helps to reinforce the incentives for 
wage moderation generated by a conservative monetary policy regime. 37  In the 
second half of the sample period (2001-07), when growth models became particularly 
entrenched, fiscal policy was considerably tighter in Germany and Sweden than the 
UK. The average cyclically adjusted primary government balance (a greater deficit 
represents a more expansive fiscal policy stance) was -1.5% of GDP in the UK, 
compared to -0.1% of GDP in Germany and 1.6% of GDP in Sweden.38 Fiscal policy 
thus complemented the German, Swedish and the UK growth models during the pre-
crisis period. 
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Carlin and Soskice use the 3-equation model to explain the growth trajectories of the 
German and UK economies during the sample period.39 They show that the sustained 
weakness in consumption and restrained government spending in Germany helped 
depreciate the real exchange rate and support the export-led growth model. In 
contrast, they show that looser fiscal policy in the UK buoyed household consumption 
at the expense of exports and reinforced the consumption-led growth model. 
Global imbalances 
The comparative political economy literature has underlined the interdependence of 
growth models during the sample period, both within the Eurozone and in the wider 
global economy. 40 The growth models were indeed deeply symbiotic; the 
consumption-led economies bought goods from the export-led economies and the 
export-led economies encouraged this spending by lending freely to the consumption-
led economies. The current account imbalances that emerged during the sample 
period reflected the flow of goods and capital between countries. The consumption-
led, current account deficit countries received net inflows of goods and capital from 
the rest of the world, whereas the opposite was true in the export-led, current account 
surplus countries. 
The 3-equation model can help explain how successful inflation targeting can 
coincide with persistent external imbalances in medium-run equilibrium when 
countries have different growth models. Carlin and Soskice set out a version of the 3-
equation model that looks at the entire global economy rather than just a single 
country.41 In this highly stylized model, the global economy is made up of two blocs 
of countries, each with their own central bank and the same unique equilibrium rate of 
output. The model assumes both countries begin in trade balance. If autonomous 
(exogenous) demand rises in one bloc relative to the other then the central bank in the 
high demand bloc will raise the interest rate to get the economy back on the path to 
medium-run equilibrium. The appreciation of the exchange rate will dampen net 
exports in the high demand bloc. It will also necessarily depreciate the exchange rate 
in the low demand bloc (the exchange rate between the two blocs in the only one in 
the global economy). The central bank in the low demand bloc must then raise the 
interest rate to offset the boost to net exports from the exchange rate depreciation. In 
the new medium-run equilibrium, the high demand bloc has an appreciated real 
exchange rate and a trade deficit and the low demand bloc has a depreciated exchange 
rate and a trade surplus. The real interest rate is higher in both blocs in order to 
squeeze out the higher autonomous demand. We can see that the shock has 
permanently altered the growth models of the two blocs: the high demand bloc has 
become more consumption-led and the low demand bloc (even though it was not 
subject to the shock directly) has become more export-led. The model is very 
simplified and relies on both central banks and the foreign exchange market being 
rational and perfectly informed. Nonetheless, it clearly shows how the interaction of 
countries with different growth models can lead to both significant external 
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imbalances and low and stable inflation, which mirrors one of the major features of 
the global economy during the pre-crisis period. 
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